Emissions regulation is a policy mechanism intended to address the threat of climate change. However, the stringency of emissions regulation varies across regions, raising concerns over carbon leakage-an outcome where stringent regulation in one region shifts production to regions with weaker regulation. It is believed that such leakage adversely increases global emissions. It is also believed that leakage can be eliminated by carbon tariffs, which are taxes imposed on imported goods so that they incur the same emissions cost that they would have if they had been produced in the regulated region. Results here contradict these beliefs. This paper demonstrates that carbon leakage can arise despite a carbon tariff but, when it does arise under a carbon tariff, it decreases emissions. Due in part to this clean leakage, results here indicate that a carbon tariff decreases global emissions. Domestic firm profits, on the other hand, can increase, decrease, or remain unchanged due to a carbon tariff, which suggests that carbon tariffs are not inherently protectionist as some argue. Rather, results here suggest that carbon tariffs improve the efficacy of emissions regulation, enabling it to reduce global emissions in many settings in which it would otherwise fail to do so.
Introduction
With carbon regulation driving projected production cost increases in excess of 40% in some industries (Drake et al. 2010 , Ryan 2012 , it can endow facilities located outside the regulated region with a windfall cost advantage. This cost advantage can enable "foreign" competitors to increase their penetration into the emissions-regulated (i.e., "domestic") market. Carbon regulation can also lead domestic firms to shift facilities offshore to avoid carbon-related costs. Such foreign entry and offshoring are both sources of carbon leakage-the displacement of production from the regulated region to offshore locations due to an increase in emissions price.
Carbon leakage could potentially be mitigated by border adjustments-tariffs on the carbon emissions of imported goods that would incur carbon costs if produced domestically. However, border adjustments have proven controversial. Proponents of border adjustments-policymakers such as the authors of the Waxman-Markey bill (US Congress, House 2009), Nobel laureate economists (Krugman 2009) , and industrial trade associations (Cement Association of Canada 2015)-argue that such a measure would treat domestic and offshore production equivalently and thereby limit environmentally damaging carbon leakage. On the other hand, border adjustment opponentsincluding politicians such as President Obama (Broder 2009 ) and China's Minister of Commerce Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Beattie and Hill 2009) , academics (Holmes et al. 2011) , and members of the popular press (The Economist 2007)-have raised arguments ranging from concerns that a border adjustment could increase the risk of trade disputes to claiming outright that a border adjustment would be " [trade] protectionism in the disguise of environmental protection." This paper contributes to the debate by assessing the effectiveness of border adjustments as a mechanism to improve the efficacy of emissions regulation, and as a mechanism to improve the profitability of domestic firms.
It is widely reported that carbon leakage increases global emissions, offsetting some or all of the regulation's emission improvements (e.g., Babiker 2005 , Demailly and Quirion 2006 , Ponssard and Walker 2008 , Di Maria and van der Werf 2008 , Fowlie 2009 , Fowlie et al. 2016 . It is also widely believed that a symmetric border adjustment will eliminate the threat of leakage (e.g., Barry 2009; Barber 2010 , Ponssard and Walker 2008 , Fowlie et al. 2016 . However, these assertions implicitly assume that the technology used in foreign production will be at least as emissions-intensive as the technology used in domestic production. As will be demonstrated, this assumption does not hold under a border adjustment if foreign producers can choose their production technology.
Preview of model and main results
This paper models imperfect competition between a set of domestic firms and a set of potential foreign entrants in an emissions-regulated market. Foreign firms can enter the market and domestic firms can exit the market, relocate offshore, or compete from within the regulated region. Domestic and foreign firms both choose production technologies and production quantities. Consistent with reports, production costs with established emissions-intensive technology and with nascent clean technology are assumed to be less in the offshore region than in the regulated region (e.g., Boston Consulting Group 2008, IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme 2008). By exploring the effect of border adjustments in a setting where firms can choose their production technologies, this paper contributes two sets of results to the literature.
First, results here contradict the beliefs that leakage always increases global emissions, and that border adjustment will eliminate leakage. This paper demonstrates that, when they hold a production cost advantage, foreign firms adopt clean technology under a border adjustment at lower emissions prices than domestic firms (Proposition 2). Within emissions price intervals in which foreign firms operate cleaner technology than domestic firms, foreign entry increases under some conditions despite a border adjustment (Proposition 4). Further, domestic firms offshore under some conditions despite a border adjustment, but doing so implies that they adopt cleaner technology when they relocate (Proposition 3). As a consequence, when carbon leakage occurs under a border adjustment, offshore technology is cleaner than that used domestically. Therefore, under mild conditions shown to hold in practical settings, carbon leakage decreases global emissions when it arises under a border adjustment (Proposition 5). These results demonstrate that carbon leakage can arise despite a border adjustment but, when it does, it can contribute to reduced global emissions. In other words, with a border adjustment, "clean leakage" is possible.
Second, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate as to whether border adjustments are climate policy or trade protectionism. Results here demonstrate that, without border adjustment, global emissions increase with emissions price or remain unchanged in any setting in which foreign firms compete or domestic firms offshore (Proposition 1). However, under mild conditions, global emissions are shown to decrease as emissions price increases in any setting with border adjustment (Proposition 5). As a consequence, imposing a border adjustment decreases global emissions relative to emissions regulation without a border adjustment (Proposition 6). Domestic firms' profits, on the other hand, can increase, decrease, or remain unchanged due to border adjustment (Proposition 7).
These results suggest that a border adjustment is not inherently protectionist. Instead, these results suggest that border adjustments are good environmental policy, enabling emissions regulation to reduce global emissions in settings that it otherwise would not. II.
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Figure 1
Results from related literature (boxes I and II), and from this paper (boxes III, IV, and IV-III)
Relation to the literature
This paper relates to work that explores technology choice under environmental policy, and work that explores carbon leakage under emissions regulation. For purposes here, the latter can be Babiker (2005) considers leakage due to offshoring in addition to foreign entry, finding that leakage increases global emissions by 30% relative to a baseline case without emissions regulation. In each of these papers, imported units are more emissions-intensive (inclusive of transport emissions) than the domestically-produced units they displace. This paper reveals the potential for "clean leakage." When leakage arises under border adjustment, it implies that imports are produced by technology that is cleaner than that used in the regulated region. It is shown here that, in practical settings, the benefit of producing with cleaner technology offshore exceeds the additional emissions generated from transport. Therefore, rather than diminishing emissions improvements, leakage contributes to additional emissions reduction under a border adjustment. Condon and Ignaciuk (2013) review work that explores border adjustment. Among the reviewed papers, none incorporate technology choice and most explore economy-wide computable general equilibrium models that assume perfect competition. In addition to these papers, Sunar and Plambeck (2016) explore emissions allocation rules when products are co-produced in a fixed ratio by a foreign supplier. They find that border adjustment can increase or decrease emissions, depending on how emissions are allocated among co-products. In more closely related work, Ponssard and Walker (2008) Table 1 Central aspects of this paper included in the most closely related literature
Firm Decisions and Performance without Border Adjustment
Under existing emissions regulation, domestic production incurs emissions costs while offshore production does not, altering the competitive balance between domestic and foreign firms.
Model development
A regulator imposes an emissions price ε for each unit of emissions generated through domestic production. Through Cournot competition, n d domestic firms compete with n f foreign firms. The domestic market is assumed to be mature prior to the implementation of emissions regulation, with N d incumbent domestic firms; domestic firms can choose to exit, but no new domestic firms enter the market due to emissions regulation, i.e., n d ≤ N d . Each domestic firm chooses a location, l ∈ {r, o}, where r indicates production in the regulated region and o indicates production offshore.
Domestic firms choosing to offshore incur fixed cost F o ≥ 0. Foreign firms enter the domestic market only if they can earn at least operating profit F e > 0, where F e represents a fixed entry cost. Each unit imported into the domestic market incurs transport cost τ > 0.
Both domestic and foreign firms choose a non-proprietary production technology k ∈ {1, 2}, with unit production and capital recovery cost γ k > 0 and emissions intensity α k ≥ 0. Without loss of Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
generality, technology 1 is the more emissions-intensive technology, α 1 > α 2 . Emissions intensity for a given production technology is assumed to be the same whether it is utilized domestically or offshore. However, imports generate an additional α τ > 0 emissions per unit through transport.
A discount factor δ represents the relative production and capital recovery cost in offshore versus domestic regions.
Three empirically-supported assumptions are made with respect to technology costs.
Assumption 1. The production and capital recovery cost for each given technology is less in the offshore region than in the domestic region; δ ∈ (0, 1) so that δγ k < γ k , ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
Assumption 1 states that it is less costly to produce with each technology in the offshore (exporting) region than in the emissions-regulated region. Practical examples support this assumption. Figure 2 illustrates the production and capital recovery cost advantage for likely cement importers to the EU under carbon leakage scenarios. These cost advantages stem from structural advantages in labor, material, electricity, maintenance, and investment costs (Boston Consulting Group 2008). While Figure 2 presents costs for established kiln technologies, emerging CCS kiln technology is also expected to be substantially less costly in regions likely to be exporters under carbon leakage scenarios than it is in developed regions such as Europe (IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme 2008).
Assumption 2. The domestic production cost of the dirty technology is less than the transport plus offshore production cost of the dirty technology; γ 1 < δγ 1 + τ .
This assumption, supported by the cement costs in Figure 2 , implies that domestic firms produce locally if emissions are unregulated. In general, the assumption is reasonable for carbon-regulated sectors (domestic regulation of the sector would not be imposed if it operated offshore when ε = 0).
Assumption 3. The production and capital recovery cost of the dirty technology is less than the production and capital recovery cost of the clean technology; γ 1 < γ 2 .
Given α 1 > α 2 , Assumption 3 ensures that technology 1 is not trivially discarded. Returning to cement as an example, the most promising abatement technology in that sector is CCS. In agreement with Assumption 3, a CCS kiln is more costly in terms of investment and operating costs than traditional precalciner kilns (European Cement Research Academy 2012).
Without a border adjustment, the total operating cost of foreign firms' preferred technology will be referred to as c f , with production cost and emissions intensity γ f and α f . The total operating cost of domestic firms' preferred technology will be referred to as c d (ε), with production cost and emissions intensity γ d and α d , respectively. Table 2 summarizes cost and emissions parameters.
Parameter Description ε Price per unit of CO 2 emissions δ Discount factor for offshore production
Fixed offshoring cost and fixed entry cost, respectively τ , α τ
Per-unit transport cost and emissions intensity, respectively
Total unit cost of domestic and foreign firms' preferred technology γ d , γ f Domestic and foreign firms' production and capital recovery cost
Emissions intensity of domestic and foreign firms' preferred technology Table 2 Cost and emissions parameters in setting without border adjustment Preferred technologies Foreign firms select technology k to minimize offshore operating cost δγ k + τ . By Assumption 3, this implies that foreign firms operate technology 1, with c f = δγ 1 + τ .
If domestic firms operate in the regulated region (i.e., if l = r), they prefer technology k that minimizes domestic operating costs γ k + α k ε, with ε d 2 = (γ 2 − γ 1 ) / (α 1 − α 2 ) representing the breakeven emissions price between technology 1 and 2 in the regulated region. However, if domestic firms offshore (i.e., if l = o) then, without border adjustment, they prefer technology 1. Therefore,
These technology choices imply that, without a border adjustment, the regulator cannot incentivize clean technology adoption if domestic firms offshore or exit at a lower emissions price than they adopt clean technology. This has practical implications. The threshold at which cement firms would offshore from Europe, for example, is estimated to be significantly less than the adoption threshold for CCS cement kilns (US Energy Information Administration 2011, and Boston Consulting Group 2008), preempting the regulator's ability to incentivize clean technology adoption.
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Objectives Each domestic firm produces x l units with its preferred technology/location. Each foreign firm produces y units with its preferred technology. The market clears at price Each domestic firm competing in the market maximizes operating profit by solving
while each foreign competitor maximizes operating profit by solving
All proofs are provided in Appendix A, including the proofs for the joint concavity of (1) and (2) in x l and y.
Equilibrium location, exit, and entry
The market structure that evolves in equilibrium is determined by three decisions-domestic firms' location decisions; domestic firms' exit decisions; and foreign firms' entry decisions. Four market structure thresholds, presented in Table 3 and described below, determine each of these decisions.
Threshold Description F o
Offshoring cost beyond which it is unprofitable for domestic firms to relocate ε o Emissions price beyond which domestic firms offshore if
Emissions price beyond which domestic firms exit if
Emissions price beyond which foreign firms enter if ε entry < ε o Table 3 Fixed offshoring and emissions price thresholds that co-determine equilibrium market structure Star notation will be used to indicate equilibrium decisions. For brevity, star notation will also indicate dependency on emissions price, so that a * implies a * (ε).
Domestic offshoring
For domestic firms to offshore in equilibrium, ε must be sufficiently large and F o sufficiently small that domestic firms can operate more profitably outside the regulated region than in it. Where π d,r (·) is each domestic firm's operating profit when producing in the regulated region, and π d,o (·) is its operating profit when producing offshore, domestic firms offshore at emissions prices greater than ε o , where
Relocation is cost prohibitive if fixed offshoring costs exceed the operating profit that each domestic firm can earn when operating outside the regulated region, i.e., if F o ≥ F o , where
In equilibrium, domestic firms choose location l * = o if ε ≥ ε o and F o < F o , and l * = r otherwise.
firms are no longer able to operate profitably within the domestic region and abandon the market at the emissions prices greater than ε exit , where
Foreign entry Foreign firms compete operating profits down to the minimum level for entry such
, which leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Without border adjustment, the equilibrium number of entrants is n * f = (h(ε)) + , where
With (3) strictly increasing in ε, the emissions price threshold above which foreign firms enter is
Note that, without border adjustment, n * f is inelastic in ε if domestic firms offshore because c d (ε) = c f . Therefore, if domestic firms offshore at a lower emissions price than foreign firms would enter (i.e., if F o < F o and ε o ≤ ε entry ), then foreign entry is preempted and will not occur at any ε. As illustrated in Figure 3a , if there is no foreign entry when ε = 0, then five equilibrium market structures can evolve, Γ m ∈ {Γ 1 , ..., Γ 5 }. In Γ 1 , emissions price is sufficiently low that domestic firms Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
produce in the regulated region and foreign firms do not enter. In Γ 2 , emissions price is sufficiently low and fixed offshoring cost sufficiently great that domestic firms produce in the regulated region.
However, unlike in Γ 1 , in region Γ 2 emissions price exceeds the entry threshold, ε > ε entry , indicating foreign entry occurs. In Γ 3 , emissions price exceeds the offshoring threshold, ε > ε o , and the fixed offshoring cost is sufficiently low that domestic firms relocate. Entry does not arise in Γ 3 , even when ε > ε entry because the offshoring threshold is less than the entry threshold, ε o ≤ ε entry , so domestic offshoring preempts foreign entry. In Γ 4 , domestic firms relocate, however, unlike in Γ 3 , ε entry < ε o so foreign firms compete in the market. In Γ 5 , offshoring is prohibitively costly with F o ≥ F o and emissions price is sufficiently great, ε ≥ ε exit , that domestic firms exit while foreign firms compete (ε > ε entry ). If there is significant entry when ε = 0, the equilibrium market structures that can evolve are depicted in Figure 3b . Note that there is no partition Γ 1 because ε entry ≤ 0 and there is no partition Γ 3 because the entry threshold is less than the offshoring threshold, ε entry < ε o , ∀F o .
Equilibrium quantities and emissions
Emissions regulation is intended to abate the driver of anthropogenic climate change: global CO 2 emissions, η. Emissions from domestic output are generated by firms' production technology. Emissions from imports, on the other hand, are generated by offshore production as well as transport to the regulated region. Therefore, without border adjustment,
The effect of emissions price on quantity decisions and resulting emissions depends on equilibrium market structure. To demonstrate this, Figure 4a provides a preview of the quantity results described in this section, while Figure 4b provides a corresponding preview of emissions results. In Figure 4a , emissions price is sufficiently low that domestic firms produce in the regulated region without foreign entrants (partition Γ 1 ), with quantities decreasing in ε. At ε d adopt clean technology, reducing the rate at which domestic quantities decrease in ε. Foreign firms enter at ε entry , shifting the market structure to Γ 2 . Over this market structure, domestic quantities decrease, foreign entry increases, and total output remains unchanged in ε. In this example F o < F o , so domestic firms offshore at ε o . Because fixed offshoring cost is non-zero (F o > 0) in this example, domestic firms' production costs decrease with offshoring and their output increases (indicated by
Emissions tax rate
With all firms operating outside of the regulated region (partition Γ 4 ), they are unaffected by further increases in ε. If, in this example, F o ≥ F o , offshoring would be cost-prohibitive and domestic firms would exit at ε exit (partition Γ 5 ).
In Figure 4b , global and domestic emissions decrease with respect to emissions price over Γ 1 due to two factors: i) the decreasing output observed in Figure 4a ; and ii) a step decrease due to the adoption of clean technology at ε d 2 . In this example, foreign firms use more emissions-intensive technology than domestic firms over Γ 2 and generate transport emissions. Therefore, despite total output remaining unchanged (as seen in Figure 4a ), global emissions increase with emissions price over Γ 2 as foreign production displaces domestic production. Lastly, global emissions step increase as domestic firms offshore at ε o .
Equilibrium quantities When location is non-central, x
* and y * denote each domestic and foreign firm's equilibrium quantities, respectively. When location is central, x * l denotes domestic quantities.
Lemma 2. Without border adjustment, total equilibrium domestic output n * d x * and foreign output n * f y * depend on market structure and are characterized by the following table:
Region Domestic decision Entry decision Total equilibrium quantities:
From Lemma 2, if domestic firms offshore or exit (partitions Γ 3 , Γ 4 , and Γ 5 ), then total domestic output is independent of emissions price. In each of these cases, domestic firms compete from outside the regulated region (i.e., c d (ε) = c f ) or they no longer compete in the market (i.e., n * d = 0). Either way, they are beyond the umbrella of emissions regulation without border adjustment, making further changes in emissions price ineffective in influencing domestic firms' quantities. Similarly, Article submitted to ; manuscript no. when domestic firm decisions are unaffected by changes in emissions price due to offshoring or exit, no incremental opportunity for foreign entry is created in the market so total foreign entry n * f y * is also unchanged. This can be observed from Lemmas 1 and 2 when c d (ε) = c f or n * d = 0. On the other hand, per Lemma 2, domestic quantities clearly decrease with respect to emissions price when domestic firms produce in the regulated region (partitions Γ 1 and Γ 2 ). In these settings, domestic firms' production cost c d (ε) increases with emissions price, driving their production volumes down. In settings where domestic firms compete in the regulated region without foreign competition (partition Γ 1 ), this decrease in domestic output trivially results in decreased total output. However, if domestic firms produce in the regulated region and compete against foreign firms (partition Γ 2 ), reduced domestic output creates an opportunity for further foreign entry. In such a setting, foreign entry increases with emissions price as domestic firms are burdened by greater emissions costs. This is evident in Lemma 1 where the number of foreign entrants increases in ε when domestic firms operate in the regulated region. Total output remains unchanged in this setting, with total foreign entry increasing at a rate of N d α d /b, the same rate at which domestic output decreases.
Notably, in the absence of border adjustment, total output only decreases with respect to emissions price if domestic firms compete in the regulated region without foreign competition (partition Γ 1 ). Total output is unaffected by changes in emissions price in all other settings. This has important emissions regulation implications for the US and EU steel industry where foreign firms compete even when emissions are costless. In these settings, without a border adjustment, carbon regulation (i.e., any ε > 0) would be unlikely to significantly affect the total output serving the region, but is likely to result in increased foreign entry relative to an unregulated (ε = 0) baseline.
In addition to changing continuously in emissions price as described above, total output can step-increases due to offshoring.
Lemma 3. Without border adjustment, offshoring strictly increases equilibrium total output if and only if no foreign entrants compete in the market when offshoring occurs h(ε o ) < 0 and fixed offshoring cost is positive F o > 0. Otherwise, total output remains unchanged due to offshoring.
If F o = 0, domestic firms offshore at the emissions price at which operating costs in the regulated region γ d + α d ε are equivalent to operating costs offshore δγ 1 + τ . If F o > 0, however, operating costs in the offshore region are less than those in the regulated region at the threshold ε o ; i.e., relocating domestic firms require greater operating profit offshore to compensate for the fixed offshoring cost they incur. Therefore, when F o > 0, domestic firms' operating costs decrease if they offshore in equilibrium and, consequently, total domestic-owned output increases. Total foreign entry decreases as a result of domestic firms' reduced operating costs (evident through Lemma 1). If foreign firms remain in the market when domestic firms offshore, then the decrease in total foreign entry fully offsets the increase in domestic output, leaving total output unchanged. Otherwise, total output increases. The magnitude of this conditional increase is characterized in the proof to Lemma 3. Regarding Propositions 1a-c, when domestic firms produce in the regulated region without foreign competition (partition Γ 1 ), total output decreases with respect to emissions price as described above. Without foreign competition, there is no shift in domestic versus foreign market share, so changes in global emissions due to increases in emissions price are driven solely by changes in total output. Therefore, global emissions also decrease with respect to emissions price in cases of a domestic oligopoly. When domestic firms produce in the regulated region and foreign firms compete (partition Γ 2 ), increases in emissions price result in carbon leakage due to entry. Total output does not change due to changes emissions price under these conditions-increases in foreign entry are offset by decreases in domestic production. However, each unit of domestic production displaced by foreign entry increases emissions by α 1 + α τ − α d . As a consequence, increasing emissions price increases global emissions in this setting (as seen in Figure 4b over partition Γ 2 ). Under domestic offshoring (partitions Γ 3 and Γ 4 ) or exit (partition Γ 5 ), the market is served only by offshore facilities. Therefore, without border adjustment, further increases in emissions price do not affect global emissions if domestic firms operate offshore or exit. Table C.1 in Appendix C characterizes these comparative static effects.
Equilibrium emissions
Proposition 1d states that carbon leakage due to offshoring, which occurs at the offshoring In short, without border adjustment, the regulator's ability to reduce global emissions through emissions regulation is limited-it is only possible in cases of a domestic oligopoly (partition Γ 1 ) or by incentivizing the adoption of clean technology. The regulator can only achieve the latter if the clean technology adoption threshold is less than the offshoring or exit threshold (whichever is applicable given fixed offshoring costs). Further, the regulator can inadvertently increase global emissions through leakage by: i) imposing emissions regulation on sectors where domestic firms produce in the regulated region and compete against foreign entrants (partition Γ 2 ); or ii) imposing emissions regulation that results in offshoring (partitions Γ 3 and Γ 4 ).
Firm Decisions and Performance with Border Adjustment
Much debate related to emissions regulation has centered on border adjustments as a possible means to prevent the adverse effects of carbon leakage. This section focuses on how results with border adjustment differ from results without border adjustment or from conventional wisdom.
Model development
The model here resembles that in Section 2 except imports incur border adjustment β k (ε) = representing the operating cost of domestic and foreign firms' preferred technology, respectively. Therefore, with a border adjustment, domestic firms maximize operating profit by solvinĝ
Each foreign competitor maximizes operating profit by solvinĝ
Equilibrium technology choice
Unlike in settings without border adjustment, with a border adjustment the regulator can incentivize any firm serving the regulated market-domestic or foreign; operating in the regulated region or offshore-to adopt clean technology at some emissions price. Counterintuitively, foreign firms' technology choices are more sensitive than domestic firms' to emissions price.
Proposition 2. With a border adjustment, foreign firms serving the regulated region adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than domestic-owned firms.
Foreign firms adopt clean technology at their break-even emissions price for technology 1 and 2,
The domestic clean technology adoption threshold is identical to that without a border adjustment,
Conditional upon entry, foreign firms therefore adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than locally-producing domestic firms, with foreign firms operating cleaner technology than locallyproducing domestic firms when ε ∈ ε f 2 , ε d 2 . Further, (as described below in Section 3.3), if domestic firms offshore in equilibrium, they do so at a threshold greater than foreign firms' clean technology adoption threshold. This implies that domestic firms adopt clean technology, whether they do so in the domestic region or offshore, at a greater emissions price than foreign firms.
A comparison of the offshore and domestic clean technology adoption thresholds in (6) and (7) reveals the centrality of Assumption 1 to the result. This assumed foreign production cost advantage δ ∈ (0, 1) therefore warrants revisiting. It should be reiterated that industry and governmental reports support this assumption. Foreign production costs are estimated to be significantly less in offshore regions than emissions-regulated regions for both established carbon-intensive technology (Boston Consulting Group 2008), and for nascent clean technology (IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme 2008). However, if Assumption 1 did not hold in a given context, then Proposition 2 and results that follow would also not hold for that specific context.
Equilibrium offshoring, exit, and entry
With border adjustment, four equilibrium market structures are of interest, Ω 1 , ..., Ω 4 . Figures 5a and 5b, the former without entry at ε = 0 and latter with entry at ε = 0, illustrate how these market structures evolve with respect to emissions price and fixed offshoring cost. Figure 5b ). The intuition underlying these observations is developed below. Domestic offshoring Conventional wisdom holds that a border adjustment will eliminate carbon leakage, including offshoring (e.g., Barry 2009 , Barber 2010 . However, results here indicate that domestic firms offshore under some conditions despite incurring a symmetric border adjustment. Operating cost frontiers when technologies are deployed domestically (black) and offshore (gray)
The gap between the cost frontiers in Figures 6a and 6b is the per-unit operating cost difference between locations. Over intervals in which domestic and offshore facilities prefer the same technol-
2 , the frontiers are parallel; both regions have the same production emissions intensity and therefore equivalent per-unit carbon costs. In emissions price intervals where offshore facilities operate cleaner technology than facilities in the regulated region, ε ∈ [ε f 2 , ε d 2 ), offshore carbon costs increase at a slower rate with respect to emissions price than domestic carbon costs.
Offshore operating costs only improve relative to operating costs in the regulated region over emissions prices between the foreign and domestic clean technology adoption thresholds,ε In such cases, domestic firms offshore atε o despite the implementation of a border adjustment.
Offshoring under border adjustment therefore implies domestic firms adopt cleaner technology when they relocate than they operated in the regulated region. As a consequence, domestic firms adopt clean technology at some emissions priceê
If technologies were more emissions-intensive when operated offshore, potentially due to the use of different inputs, then the slopes illustrated in Figures 6a and 6b would not be parallel. In such a case, provided that cost frontiers intersect when applying region-specific emissions intensities (as in Figure 6a ), Proposition 3 and all other results would continue to hold. If domestic and offshore cost frontiers do not intersect (for any reason), then domestic firms would not offshore under border adjustment. In such a case, all results except Propositions 3, 5b, and 6e would still hold.
Domestic exit Under a border adjustment, it is straightforward to show that domestic firm profits are independent of emissions price when foreign firms compete in the market and operate the same technology as foreign firms. Therefore, given that foreign firms adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than domestic firms with a border adjustment (per Proposition 2),ε exit < ε d 2 is a necessary condition for domestic firm exit. This relationship holds only if offshore production costs are unrealistically small relative to domestic production costs; i.e., if
Such a condition is unlikely to be met in practice given the substantial transport costs for leakagethreatened goods. In cement, for example, transport costs are greater than production costs in four of the five offshore regions in Figure 2 , which would require δ < 0 for domestic exit. Therefore, given the impracticality of such outcomes, it is assumed thatn * d = N d in the discussion that follows. Foreign entry and exit Without border adjustment, the number of foreign entrants increased with emissions price if domestic firms operated in the regulated region with foreign competitors in the market. The number of entrants was unaffected by emissions price in all other settings.
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. However, with border adjustment, the equilibrium number of entrants can be non-monotonic. Entry can increase over intervals in which foreign firms operate cleaner technology than domestic firms, but entry decreases if domestic and foreign firms operate identical technology.
The characterization of the number of foreign entrants under border adjustment,n * f , resembles the characterization of n * f in Lemma 1 (and the proof is symmetric), witĥ
If foreign firms operate cleaner technology than domestic firms, it is straightforward to show that (8) increases with respect to emissions price if and only if the following inequality holds
In contexts where (9) holds, 1 clean technology offers a sufficient emissions intensity improvement relative to dirty technology that the number of foreign entrants increases with respect to emissions price over intervals where foreign firms operate cleaner technology than domestic firms. In such cases, foreign firms enter the market atε entry = {ε|ĥ(ε) = 0, ε ∈ ε f 2 ,ê d 2 } and they exit at ε
However, if (9) does not hold, then the number of foreign entrants decreases monotonically with respect to emissions price. In such a case, there is no entry threshold and foreign firms that competed in the market at ε = 0 would exit atε f exit = {ε|ĥ(ε) = 0}.
Equilibrium quantities and emissions
Figures 7a and 7b provide a preview of the effect emissions price has on quantities and emissions, respectively, in settings where a border adjustment has been implemented. 2 ), which contradicts the conventional wisdom that border adjustment will eliminate carbon leakage. Second, total output strictly decreases with respect to emissions price in Figure 7a , which differs from the setting without border adjustment where total output was unaffected by changes in emissions price in the comparable market structure (partition Γ 2 ). Third, global emissions strictly decrease with respect to emissions price in Figure 7b , differing from the setting without border adjustment where global emissions decreased with respect to emissions price only in cases of domestic oligopoly, and strictly increased with emissions price when domestic firms operated in the regulated region with foreign entry.
Emissions tax rate
Equilibrium quantities As in the setting without border adjustment,x * andŷ * denote each domestic and foreign firm's equilibrium quantity when location is clear and non-central, andx * l denotes each domestic firm's production when location is otherwise unclear or central.
Lemma 4. With border adjustment, equilibrium total domestic outputn * dx * and foreign output n * fŷ * depend on market structure and are characterized by the following table:
Region Domestic decision Entry decision Total equilibrium quantities: Domestic,n * dx * Foreign,n * fŷ * Ω 1
Domestic production
No entry
Offshore production
The number of foreign entrants, given by (8), and firms' production quantities, presented in Lemma 4, provide insights related to total output and the potential for carbon leakage in settings with a border adjustment. With border adjustment, as emissions price increases, operating costs for all participants in the market increase regardless of equilibrium market structure. This leads to Proposition 4a, the equilibrium total output serving the market decreases with respect to emissions price regardless of equilibrium market structure. This sharply differs from the setting without border adjustment where total output only decreased in the case of a domestic oligopoly (partition Γ 1 ).
Regarding Proposition 4b, if domestic and foreign firms operate identical technology, then they are equally exposed to changes in emissions price. In such cases, the reduced market size (decreased total output) resulting from an increase in emissions price leaves less opportunity for foreign entry, and the number of entrants decreases. This is evident from (8) if domestic and foreign firms operate identical technology,ĉ f (ε) =ĉ d (ε). However, over intervals where foreign firms operate cleaner technology than domestic firms, they are relatively less exposed to emissions price. In such cases, their operating cost increases with emissions price at a slower rate than domestic firms' operating cost. As a consequence, if emissions price falls in the interval between foreign and domestic firms' clean technology adoption thresholds, ε ∈ [ε f 2 ,ê d 2 ), total foreign entry can increase with emissions price. This occurs if clean technology offers a sufficient emissions improvement relative to the dirty technology, i.e., if (9) holds. As described in footnote 1 above, this inequality holds trivially in cement, requiring only N d > 0.11. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that border adjustment will eliminate the threat of carbon leakage (Barry 2009 , Barber 2010 , Ponssard and Walker 2008 , Fowlie et al. 2016 ). Carbon leakage due to entry can arise despite border adjustment.
Similar to the setting without border adjustment, when a border adjustment has been implemented, total output potentially step-increases due to domestic offshoring. 
but otherwise increase due to offshoring.
When domestic firms compete alone in the market, increases in emissions price reduce their output, per Proposition 4, and therefore reduce global emissions. Unlike the setting without border adjustment, this is true whether domestic firms operate alone in the regulated region (partition Ω 1 ) or offshore (partition Ω 3 ). When domestic firms compete against foreign firms and operate
2 ) and partition Ω 4 ), total foreign entry decreases with respect to emissions price, per Proposition 4, and domestic-owned output is unchanged by changes in emissions price (which is evident through Lemma 4). Global emissions again decrease as a result, which also differs from the setting without border adjustment where global emissions are unchanged or increasing with respect to emissions price when foreign firms compete.
If domestic firms operate in the regulated region and foreign firms compete with cleaner technol-
2 )), increases in emissions price decrease total output but increase carbon leakage due to entry, per Proposition 4. In contrast to the setting without border adjustment, when a border adjustment is implemented, each unit of leakage reduces emissions intensity if α 1 − α 2 − α τ > 0; each unit of carbon leakage replaces a unit of dirty production in the regulated region with a unit of clean production and international transport. Further, one must also account for changes in total output, which decreases with respect to emissions price. Therefore, when accounting for both the change in per unit emissions intensity and the change in total output, global emissions decrease as foreign entry increases if and only if (10) Table C .2 in Appendix C characterizes these effects.
Regarding Proposition 5b, there is an intensity and volume effect to consider. The emissions intensity of production decreases by α 1 − α 2 for each unit of production moved offshore (per Proposition 3). However, α τ transport emissions are also generated for each unit imported into the regulated region. Therefore, the emissions intensity of the N dx * r (ε o ) units moved offshore decreases Article submitted to ; manuscript no. if α 1 − α 2 − α τ > 0. However, per Lemma 5, total output can increase due to offshoring. Therefore, total global emissions decrease due to offshoring only if emissions intensity decreases sufficiently to offset the α 2 + α τ emissions generated per unit of additional output,Q o , potentially produced due to offshoring. This gives rise to condition (11). Returning to cement as an example, recall that α 2 and α τ are each approximately 10% of α 1 (Cement Sustainability Initiative 2009, and Log-net.com 2014). Therefore, by condition (11), global emissions would decrease due to offshoring unless total output were to increase by more than 400% of pre-offshoring domestic production.
In short, border adjustment provides the regulator with greater ability to use emissions price as a mechanism to reduce global emissions. With a border adjustment: i) total output strictly decreases with respect to emissions price, rather than decreasing only if domestic firms produce in the regulated region without foreign competition; ii) carbon leakage from both offshoring and entry decrease emissions under some conditions, rather than strictly increasing emissions; and, iii) the regulator can incentivize the adoption of clean technology by both domestic and foreign firms, rather than only being able to incentivize such adoption among domestic firms, and only if the adoption threshold is less than the offshoring or exit threshold (whichever is applicable given F o ).
Effects on Emissions Regulation Efficacy and Welfare Performance
This section explores how the decision whether or not to implement a border adjustment affects emissions regulation efficacy and social welfare. Throughout this section, border adjustment costs per unit are β k , where β k = 0 without border adjustment and β k = α k ε with border adjustment.
Superscript w denotes parameters and equilibrium decisions given the regulator's decision whether or not to implement a border adjustment. For example, equilibrium domestic quantities are:
The effect of border adjustment on emissions regulation efficacy
Emissions regulation is intended to reduce equilibrium global emissions,
If, in the absence of border adjustment, foreign firms would compete in the market or domestic firms would offshore, then a border adjustment improves the regulator's ability to deliver on this intent. Proposition 6. Border adjustment strictly decreases global emissions if, without border adjustment, foreign firms compete in the market and/or domestic firms offshore, Γ m ∈ {Γ 2 , ..., Γ 5 }. Border adjustment decreases emissions through five mechanisms: a) reduced total output; b) reduced transport emissions; c) clean foreign-owned production if ε ≥ε f 2 and foreign firms compete in the market under border adjustment, Ω m ∈ {Ω 2 , Ω 4 }; d) clean domestic production if ε ≥ ε d 2 and border adjustment prevents offshoring, Γ m ∈ {Γ 3 , Γ 4 } and Ω m ∈ {Ω 1 , Ω 2 }; and e) clean offshoring if domestic firms offshore despite border adjustment, Ω m ∈ {Ω 3 , Ω 4 }.
Proposition 6 states that border adjustment reduces global emissions if, without such a mechanism, foreign firms compete and/or domestic firms offshore. In such settings, border adjustment improves the regulator's control over both the total output serving the market and the emissions intensity of production. Thus, border adjustment enables greater control over global emissions.
Without border adjustment, total output n * d x * + n * f y * decreases with respect to emissions price only in the case of domestic oligopoly, partition Γ 1 (per Section 2.3). However, with border adjustment, total output decreases with respect to emissions price across all market structure equilibria per Proposition 4. As a consequence, total output is less under a border adjustment if foreign firms compete and/or domestic firms offshore without a border adjustment. Further, without border adjustment, offshore facilities produce with dirty technology. However, if foreign firms compete in the market under border adjustment, they adopt clean technology if ε ≥ε f 2 , reducing the emissions intensity of foreign-owned production vis-à-vis the setting without border adjustment.
Border adjustment can also enable reduced emissions intensity if offshoring would occur without such a mechanism. The emissions price at which domestic firms offshore is greater with border adjustment than without it,ε o ≥ ε o . Border adjustment can therefore deter offshoring. Such deterrence has two benefits with respect to global emissions. First, by preventing domestic firms from offshoring and then importing into the regulated region, border adjustment contributes to decreased transport emissions. Second, offshoring deterrence can improve the regulator's ability to incentivize clean technology adoption by domestic-owned firms. Domestic firms operate dirty technology if they offshore in the absence of border adjustment. However, if border adjustment deters offshoring, the regulator incentivizes clean technology adoption by those firms if emissions price is at least as great as the domestic clean technology adoption threshold, ε ≥ ε d 2 . On the other hand, if domestic firms offshore despite border adjustment, they adopt clean technology when doing so, per Proposition 3. In either case, border adjustment enables the adoption of clean technology among domestic-owned firms in settings in which they would operate dirty technology without border adjustment. Consequently, border adjustment improves the regulator's ability to reduce the emissions intensity of domestic-owned production.
In short, in any setting in which it would have an effect, a border adjustment improves the regulator's ability to use emissions price as a lever to reduce total output and, in some scenarios, to reduce emissions from transportation and/or to incentivize the adoption of clean technology.
The effect of border adjustment on welfare
When choosing whether or not to implement a border adjustment, the domestic regulator must consider traditional welfare drivers as well as emissions revenues and emissions-driven social costs.
Total domestic firm profits in equilibrium are Π w = n The domestic regulator maximizes equilibrium welfare, W , through the following objective:
Border adjustment affects welfare drivers in opposing directions and can therefore increase or decrease welfare. Where ∆a =â − a, a border adjustment improves welfare if and only if
As demonstrated by Proposition 6 and its related discussion, border adjustment decreases global emissions, and therefore the social cost of carbon, in any setting in which it would apply (i.e., ∆ξ is negative). Further, it is straightforward to demonstrate that border adjustment increases emissions revenues (i.e., ∆ρ is positive); unsurprising given that the regulator collects revenues from both domestic and offshore production under border adjustment and from only domestic production without such a mechanism. Both of these effects increase welfare and contribute to (12) holding. However, consumer surplus works in the opposite direction. As discussed above, total output decreases with border adjustment. Consequently, consumer surplus also decreases (i.e., ∆ψ is negative). As a result, the effect border adjustment has on welfare is ambiguous. For example, define T as total output without border adjustment, n * d x * + n * f y * , andT as total output with border adjustment,n * dx * +n * fŷ * . If domestic firms offshore and face foreign competition with and without border adjustment, the inequality in (12) equates to
The LHS of (13) is negative asT < T and α 2 < α 1 . However, the RHS can be positive or negative as the first term of the RHS is strictly negative, while the second term of the RHS is strictly positive.
Whether (13) holds depends, in part, on the per-unit social cost of carbon (ε s ), the magnitude of change in total output (T − T ), and the emissions intensity of firms' preferred technologies with and without border adjustment (α 2 and α 1 , respectively).
Irrespective of these ambiguous overall welfare effects, in order to contribute to the debate as to whether border adjustments are protectionist measures or climate policy, it is important to understand how border adjustment affects domestic firm profits. In order for a border adjustment to be considered protectionist, domestic firms, at a minimum, should be no worse off as a consequence of the mechanism. However, the effect border adjustment has on domestic firms' profits, ∆Π from (12), can be positive, negative, or zero.
Proposition 7. Total domestic firms' profit can increase, decrease, or remain unchanged due to the implementation of a border adjustment.
A border adjustment increases domestic firm profits if, in the absence of such a mechanism, domestic firms operate in the regulated region with foreign entry. In this case, border adjustment reduces total foreign entry and domestic firms' profit benefits. However, if domestic firms would offshore without a border adjustment, then the mechanism can reduce their profits. In this case, domestic firms incur greater emissions costs due to border adjustment-either directly through the border adjustment while operating offshore, or by continuing to operate in the regulated region if offshoring is deterred by border adjustment. Lastly, if domestic firms offshore and foreign firms participate in the market with and without border adjustment, foreign entry competes operating profit down to F e for all participants, domestic firms included. As a consequence, domestic firms earn equivalent profit with and without border adjustment.
Considered together, Propositions 6 and 7 suggest that the general benefit of a border adjustment is not to protect domestic firms' profits as some have argued (e.g., Beattie and Hill 2009, The Economist 2007) . Proposition 7 states that, if foreign entry and/or domestic offshoring would occur in the absence of a border adjustment, domestic firm profits could benefit or could be harmed by the implementation of such a mechanism. Proposition 6, on the other hand, states that global emissions strictly decrease with the implementation of a border adjustment under identical conditions. These results suggest that border adjustments are good climate policy rather than protectionism. Border adjustments improve the efficacy of emissions regulation by eliminating adverse outcomes from carbon leakage and by enabling emissions price to be used to reduce global emissions in all settings.
Implications and Conclusions
There are two widely held beliefs related to carbon leakage-that carbon leakage increases global emissions; and that a border adjustment eliminates the threat of carbon leakage. However, this paper suggest that neither of these beliefs necessarily holds if: i) firms can choose production technologies; and ii) offshore producers have a production cost advantage. In such settings it is shown here that foreign firms adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than domestic In any setting in which domestic firms would offshore or foreign firms would compete in the absence of a border adjustment, the implementation of a border adjustment provides five potential sources of emissions improvement relative to emissions regulation without border adjustment (Proposition 6). First, it reduces total output relative to emissions-regulated settings without border adjustment. Second, it reduces emissions from transport to the regulated region. Third, it potentially enables the regulator to incentivize clean production in the regulated region. Fourth, it potentially enables the regulator to incentivize clean production by foreign entrants. Fifth and finally, it results in "clean" leakage due to offshoring by domestic firms in any setting in which offshoring arises despite the border adjustment. The latter three sources of benefit require technology choice, highlighting the importance of accounting for firms' technology decisions when assessing the effects of border adjustment policy.
Domestic firm profits can increase or decrease due to border adjustment (Proposition 7). However, a border adjustment strictly decreases global emissions in any setting in which it would have an effect (Proposition 6). Together, these results suggest that a border adjustment is not inherently protectionist as some argue, but rather that it enables carbon regulation to deliver on its intended purpose: the reduction of global emissions.
A. Technical Appendix-Proofs
Proof of joint concavity of firm objectives. FOCs for each firm i ∈ N d and firm
and
The joint concavity of firm objectives can be proven directly through the Hessian. Based on the FOCs in Equations (14) and (15), the second derivative of domestic and offshore objectives are
while the cross-partials are
Elements composing the main diagonal of the Hessian are equal to −2b while all other elements are equal to −b. As a consequence, all odd-ordered leading principal minors are strictly negative and all even-ordered leading principal minors are positive, thereby implying strict concavity.
Proof of Lemma 1. The following equilibrium quantities are required to prove Lemma 1:
Lemma 6. With the number of domestic and foreign competitors fixed at n d and n f > 0, domestic and foreign firms, respectively, produce at equilibrium quantities
Proof of Lemma 6. Since the problem is symmetric for all domestic firms and is likewise symmetric for all foreign firms, solving (15) for y * yields
Substituting (16) into (14) and then solving for x l yields
which, by substituting into (16) yields
The number of offshore entrants follows directly from its definition,
The result follows from the quantities in Equations (17) and (18), and the constraint that n f ≥ 0.
Proof of Domestic quantities then follow directly from (17) and foreign quantities follow from (18). For Γ 5 , foreign quantities are determined directly from (18) when n * f is again equal to the righthand argument of (19) and n * d = 0. Proof of Lemma 3 Define Q o as the change in total output due to offshoring. Where
If F o ≤ F o , then without entry (i.e., when n * f = y * = 0), the unique solution to ε o is
while, with entry (i.e., n * f > 0), the unique solution is
If (20) and (21), α τ ) , where ε ∆ is the change in emissions intensity due to offshoring, and Q o is the change in total output due to offshoring defined in Lemma 3's proof. Emissions intensity increases due to offshoring by at least α t and, per Lemma 3, total output is non-decreasing due to offshoring.
Proof of Proposition 2 Offshore firms prefer type 2 if δγ 2 +α 2 ε+τ ≤ δγ 1 +α 1 ε+τ . Therefore the offshore adoption threshold isε f 2 = δ(γ 2 − γ 1 )/(α 1 − α 2 ). Symmetrically, the clean technology adoption threshold in the regulated region is ε d 2 = (γ 2 − γ 1 )/(α 1 − α 2 ). δ ∈ (0, 1) impliesε
Further, if domestic firms offshore, they only do so at an emissions price greater thanε f 2 , which follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3 Whereα r andα o are the emissions intensity of domestic firms' preferred type within and outside the regulated region, without entry, the solution toε o iŝ
while the solution with entry iŝ 
Define T z andT z , z ∈ {1, 2}, as the z th case of (26) and (27), respectively. By Assumption 3, δγ 1 + τ < δγ f +α f ε + τ , ∀ε > 0, therefore T 1 >T 1 and T 2 >T 2 . Further, T 1 > T 2 iff (N d + 1) √ F e b > A − δγ 1 − τ , which holds iff the conditions for T 1 apply (in turn implying n * f > 0 per Lemma 1 and l * = o). Therefore, if T = T 1 , then T 1 > T 2 , and T >T by transitivity whetherT =T 1 orT =T 2 .
Likewise, if T = T 2 , then T 2 > T 1 , and T >T by transitivity whetherT =T 1 orT =T 2 .
Lemma 8. If ε > ε entry and/or ε > ε o and F o < F o , then transport emissions under a border adjustment n * dx * o +n * fŷ * (α f + α τ ) are less than transport emissions without border adjustment
Therefore,Π < Π by Assumption 3. Table B.1 Market, cost, and emissions parameters used in numerical illustrations.
C. Global Emissions Comparative Statics by Market Structure
Market Change in global emissions wrt ε driven by: structure Carbon leakage through entry Total output 
Market
Change in global emissions wrt ε driven by structure Carbon leakage through entry Total output 
